Maritime and Cyber-Physical Risk

When this approach is needed

Typical business situations

Case 1

Ballast, propulsion and navigation systems are networked, and class rules on cyber resilience (IACS UR E26 and E27) apply to new ships.

DecisionWhich systems could turn a compromise into a stability or safety event, and how quickly?

Case 2

Investment in monitoring and incident response needs a performance target.

DecisionHow fast must detection and containment be to stay ahead of an attack's propagation?

Case 3

Underwriters and owners need more than a checklist of vulnerabilities.

DecisionUnder which attack speeds and response delays does a loss occur, and how often?

Case 4

Crews and shore teams train against static scenarios.

DecisionHow does the incident unfold over time under different responses — and what does the team learn from running it?

What you receive

A dynamic model of the attack–defence race for the system in question
The threshold — detection delay against attack speed — beyond which containment arrives too late
Detection and response requirements derived from that threshold
A scenario set for exercises and for reporting to management and class

How an engagement runs

ScopeSelect the systems whose compromise could have physical consequences.
ModelRepresent attacker propagation, the defender's delayed perception, response capacity and the physical process.
AnalyseMap the threshold between containment and loss across attack speeds and response delays.
ApplyTranslate the threshold into requirements, investment priorities and exercise scenarios.

Reference

Approach: Ships, ports and other operational-technology environments are now networked. The relevant question is no longer only whether a system can be compromised, but whether detection and response are fast enough to prevent a physical consequence. Dynamic models answer that question, and turn it into concrete requirements for detection and response.
Core question: Is the organisation's detection and response fast enough to stop a cyber incident before it becomes a physical loss — and if not, by how much?
Method: System dynamics models of attack propagation, perception delay, response capacity and the physical process, with threshold analysis across attack and response parameters.
Evidence: The Dynamic Cyber-Risk Model (DDRA) models a cyberattack on a ship's ballast control system and identifies a Dynamic Inadequacy Threshold beyond which containment arrives too late; it runs the same equations as the paper on SSRN.
Related offer: Disruption Diagnostic.

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